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Abstract
In the run-up to the December 2009 Copenhagen climate conference, the authors surveyed members of the international 
development community with a special interest in climate change on three sets of detailed questions: (1) what action 
different country groups should take to limit climate change; (2) how much non-market funding there should be for 
emissions reductions and adaptation in developing countries, and how it should be allocated; and (3) which institutions 
should be involved in delivering climate assistance, and how the system should be governed. About 500 respondents 
from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19–24, 2009. About a third of the respondents grew up in 
developing countries, although some of them now live in developed countries. A broad majority of respondents from 
both developing and developed countries held very similar views on the responsibilities of the two different country 
groups, including on issues that have been very controversial in the negotiations. Most favored binding commitments 
now by developed countries, and commitments by 2020 by ‘advanced developing countries’ (Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa and others), limited use of offsets by developed countries, strict monitoring of compliance with commitments, and 
the use of trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in very narrow circumstances. Respondents from developing 
countries favored larger international transfers than those from developed countries, but the two groups share core 
ideas on how transfers should be allocated. Among institutional options for managing climate programs, a plurality of 
respondents from developed (48 percent) and developing (56 percent) countries preferred a UN-managed world climate 
fund, while many from both groups also embraced the UN Adaptation Fund’s approach, which is to accredit national 
institutions within countries which are eligible to manage implementation of projects that the Fund finances. Among 
approaches to governance, the most support went to the Climate Investment Fund model—of equal representation of 
developing and developed countries on the board. 
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Development. Summary 
In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate conference, CGD sought the views of members of the 
development community with a special interest in climate change on three sets of detailed questions 
relating to: (1) action to limit climate change; (2) international financial transfers and their allocation; 
and (3) institutions and governance in delivering climate assistance. A total of 479 respondents from 88 
countries completed the survey between November 19 and 24, 2009. About 28% of the respondents 
grew up in developing countries; respondents were highly educated, and came from diverse 
professional backgrounds. 
The survey analysis focuses on differences and similarities in the views of developing and developed-
country respondents. 
(1) Action and responsibilities: There was consensus among developing and developed-country 
participants on the responsibilities of the two different country groups in limiting climate change, 
including on issues that are very controversial in the negotiations. Regardless of country of origin or 
residence, respondents generally favored: differentiated but strong action to reduce emissions from all 
major emitters; limited offset use; strict monitoring of compliance with promised emissions reductions; 
and the use of trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in very narrow circumstances. 
Respondents from both country groupings showed similar willingness to pay for a hypothetical 
guarantee that there would never be ‘dangerous’ climate change (5% of household income p.a. at the 
median). 
(2) International transfers and their allocation: Nearly all respondents favored some international 
support for emissions reductions (94%) and adaptation (98%) in developing countries. Developing-
country respondents consistently favored higher funding levels: 71% of them thought that developed 
countries should cover more than 40% of (non-market) investment for emissions reductions, as 
opposed to slightly more than half among developed-country respondents. Views similarly diverged on 
adaptation funding. Yet, respondents agreed on the key criteria in allocating funds: cost efficiency and 
pioneering new opportunities for emissions reductions funds; and vulnerability to climate impacts for 
adaptation funds. Perhaps surprisingly, developing-country respondents placed greater emphasis than 
developed-country respondents on potential recipient governments having a good track record and 
proven capacity to implement projects.  
(3) Institutions and governance: All respondents tended to favor having multiple channels for 
delivering climate assistance. They generally were more favorable to innovative approaches by   2
multiple possible actors than to reliance primarily on existing institutions. The idea of a new UNFCCC- 
managed world climate fund had the most support (50% thought it should take on “very broad 
responsibilities”) and the most detractors (17% thought the institution “should not play any role”), the 
latter primarily from developed countries. All participant groups liked the approach of delegating 
implementation to accredited domestic institutions in developing countries. Involving bilateral aid 
agencies met with little support among either group. Their opinions of current multilateral 
organizations diverged: developing-country respondents felt much more positive toward the UN and 
regional development banks than towards the World Bank; in contrast, developed country respondents 
preferred the World Bank over the UN and the regional banks.  
Attitudes toward governance arrangements were generally skeptical, with broad approval from both 
regional groups only for the approach taken by the Climate Investment Funds, where developing and 
developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and decision-making is by consensus. 
Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea, over and above a ‘one country, one 
vote’ approach. Many respondents commented on the need to transcend the dichotomy between 
‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries, and to forge compromise on governance. 
In summary, the survey showed consensus among a diverse group of respondents in agreement on 
what actions to take. Preferences on burden-sharing varied across the two main country groups, but 
respondents shared common views on the use of funds. Respondents were not unanimous in their 
views of institutions and governance arrangements, but they tended to favor reform and compromise 
proposals.   3
Introduction: a diverse, highly educated group of respondents, with a focus on development and the 
environment 
Overall, 479 respondents from 88 countries completed the survey between November 19-24, 2009. 
About 28% of the respondents identified themselves as having grown up in a developing country, and 
27% percent currently live in a developing country (this includes some who were born in a developed 
country).1 (Numbers of respondents by country of origin and country of residence are shown in Annex 
1.) More than a third of respondents (36%) now live in a country different from their country of birth. 
The survey was targeted to recipients of CGD’s climate newsletter, although it was open to all, and was 
advertized on CGD’s website. As intended, the sample consisted primarily of professionals interested in 
or active in the development community,2 and with a special awareness of climate change. Indeed, 
35% of respondents work professionally on climate issues, and 44% on other environmental issues – a 
higher share among developing-country respondents in both cases.3 Nearly all respondents follow 
Copenhagen-related news either regularly (55%) or occasionally (41%). 
Respondents were highly educated, with about half holding Masters degrees as their highest 
qualification, and a quarter holding PhDs. A plurality was trained in economics (28%), and somewhat 
fewer in the sciences or engineering (23%) or other social sciences (22%). These profiles were very 
similar among developing and developed-country respondents. More than two- thirds work in public 
or quasi-public jobs, a larger share among those who grew up in developing countries. Respondents of 
all ages (19-87 years) took the survey; the median age was 45, with far fewer respondents above the age 
                                                 
1 We use the terms ‘developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’ in the sense in which they are used 
in the climate negotiations. Thus, ‘developed countries’ refers to the countries included in Annex I of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, i.e., those that are obliged to reduce emissions. 
Annex I countries include all OECD members with the exception of Korea and Mexico, as well as other 
high-income countries and most transition economies. Since we find that the country where 
respondents grew up proved generally a more consistent predictor of attitudes than country of 
residence, we refer to respondents who grew up in developing countries as “developing-country 
respondents,” regardless of current residence (and correspondingly for “developed-country 
respondents”). 
2 In addition to statistics presented here, consult Annex 2 for a list of professional affiliations to further 
illustrate this claim. 
3 Where this summary makes positive statements on whether distributions are similar or different over 
sample groups, it means to imply statistically significant relationships that were significant at the 0.1 
level, in normal-based or distribution-free tests, as appropriate in the relevant context. Given the 
limited sample size, the summary does not distinguish between different significance levels. Where the 
analysis makes conditional statements on relationships, it means to imply that the relationship could 
not be disproven, but was not entirely robust to different specifications. See section two for details.   4
of 65 among developing-country respondents (1.7%) than in developed countries (10%). About 35% of 
participants were women, fewer among developing-country respondents (26%). 
The survey allowed participants to self-select, and did not intend to gather a sample that would be 
representative of any larger population group. It sought to elicit views on detailed questions of 
implementation, rather than general attitudes. Hence, David Wheeler’s (2007) observation in the 
context of a survey using a similar approach is relevant that “random sampling on such a specialized 
topic in large, diffuse populations would confront validity problems because many respondents would 
lack the requisite information.”4 
In giving voice to the opinions of its respondent group, the survey aims to supplement the findings of 
more extensive recent surveys, including internationally representative public attitudes polls 
conducted by PIPA/World Bank and HSBC, and GlobeScan’s key respondent surveys. By comparison 
to the former, the present survey asked more complex questions relating to implementation and 
governance. By comparison to the latter, it sought to elicit the views of respondents who work 
professionally on, or have a pronounced interest in development. Unlike the respondents to previous 
surveys, this group of respondents appears well-positioned to draw upon specialized knowledge of the 
lessons of development assistance and apply it when considering alternative approaches for delivering 
potentially large amounts of climate-related funding from the rich world to the developing world. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in two sections. Section one discusses the main results 
qualitatively. Section 2 provides detailed results and a technical note. The analysis focuses on 
differences and similarities in the views of developing and developed-country respondents, as well as 
among somewhat more disaggregated regional groups (U.S. respondents, respondents from other 
developed countries, from the ‘advanced developing countries’5, from Sub-Saharan Africa, and from 
other developing countries). It occasionally discusses how other respondent characteristics correlate 
with views. 
                                                 
4 David Wheeler (2007), “It’s One World out There: The Global Consensus in Selecting the World 
Bank’s next President.” Working Paper Number 123, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development. 
5 As the survey noted, “The term ‘advanced developing countries’ intends to distinguish between 
countries with relatively high and relatively low emissions and capacity. For instance, Japan mentions 
“Parties which have a substantial contribution to the global emissions of greenhouse gases and have 
appropriate response capacities.” The EU suggests that “OECD members and candidates for 
membership thereof” should take more action. This would include Korea and Mexico as OECD 
members, and countries with “enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership,” namely 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. This is probably the list of countries that those who 
want to make a distinction among developing countries have in mind.”   5
1. Main results 
1.1  Broad consensus on what action should be taken 
There was consensus among developing and developed-country participants on the kind of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r y  g r o u p s  s h o u l d  t a k e  o n  i n  l i m i t i n g  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e .  L a r g e  
majorities favored, without distinction between developing and developed country background: 
-  Binding targets for developed countries were appropriate, rather than a bottom-up catalogue 
of commitments (89%); 
-  Binding targets for ‘advanced developing countries’ no later than 2020 (88%); 
-  Permitting limited use of offsets (70%) – i.e., developed countries can temporarily fulfill some 
of their commitments by funding emissions reductions in developing countries; 
-  Tighter emissions reporting requirements (95%) and independent third-party review of 
actions to reduce emissions growth (81%); 
A majority (56%) favored permitting trade measures (e.g. carbon-related tariffs) only in narrowly 
defined circumstances, such as to enforce compliance with previous commitments. While overall 
opinion varies more widely overall on this question, it does not vary much between developing and 
developed-country respondents. 
Given the amount of acrimony over these issues in the negotiations, it is surprising how few 
differences in opinion emerged among respondents. Consensus extends also to what respondents are 
willing to do privately, as expressed by willingness to pay for a (hypothetical) guarantee that there 
would never be climate change that respondents would consider ‘dangerous’. Median willingness to 
pay (5% of household income p.a.) was higher than most projections of the cost of effective action. A 
large majority (86%) felt that they were willing to pay as much or more than they expected effective 
action to limit climate change to cost. Developing-country respondents were less optimistic that this 
would be enough to cover the cost of effective action. 
 
1.2  Developed-country funding: disagreement on amounts, consensus on key allocation criteria, 
and strong developing-country support for rewarding performance 
While the respondents’ national background had little influence over their views on what actions 
different countries should take, it mattered for their opinion on how much funding developed   6
countries should provide (in addition to any carbon-market funds) to reduce emissions in developing 
countries, and how it should be managed. Almost all respondents (94%) favored some level of non-
market funding, and less than half (42%) thought that developed countries should cover no more than 
40% of the investment needs. Yet, developing-country participants consistently favored higher values, 
while U.S. respondents in particular supported comparatively low levels. Thus, for example, nearly a 
third of developing country respondents though that developed countries should pay more than 70 
percent of the these costs, while only about 18 percent of respondents from developed countries 
favored this view. 
Regarding adaptation funding, the 
survey phrased its question as a 
matter not only of fairness, but also 
of effectiveness. It stressed that 
adaptation funding might encounter 
problems similar to those that 
bedevil development assistance, 
such as so-called ‘absorptive 
capacity’ constraints, and thus asked 
respondents how much funding 
could be effectively used. Nearly all 
respondents (98%) felt that some 
additional adaptation funding would 
be useful. Yet, the majority of 
respondents (60%) cautioned that 
funding in excess of $50bn p.a. was 
more than could be effectively 
deployed. Some developing 
countries have sought funds in this 
range: for instance, the African 
Group has called for $67bn p.a. Developing-country participants were more likely to advocate very 
high amounts of funding, over $100bn, and less likely to think that only less than $25bn could be used 





















Respondents from all backgrounds thought that the most important criteria in allocating funds were 
cost efficiency and pioneering new opportunities (for the allocation of emissions reductions funds), and 
the vulnerability of recipients to climate impacts (for allocation of adaptation funds). Developing-
country respondents were somewhat more likely to prefer an equal distribution by country of funds for 
emissions reductions (they often commented on the need to overcome the bias of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)6 toward China and other large developing countries). Developing 
country respondents also gave greater weight to need (in terms of low income) for the allocation of 
adaptation funds. 
Yet, they also placed greater emphasis than developed-country respondents on a good track record, and 
on the implementing capacity of recipient governments. For instance, 41% of developing-country 
respondents thought a that “very considerable” role in allocating adaptation funds should be accorded 
to a good past performance record (such as measurable improvements in water management or health 
system capacity) and high implementing capacity (measured, e.g., in governance indicators), as opposed 
to 22% of developed-country respondents. 
How big a role should the following criteria play in allocating funds for emissions reductions? 
  Region  No role  Limited  Considerable  Very considerable  Respondents 
Cost 
efficiency 
Developed 2%  9%  41%  48%  340 
Developing 4% 9%  35%  53%  133 
Even 
distribution 
Developed 20%  54%  22% 5%  338 
Developing 22% 31%  30% 17%  132 
Past 
performance 
Developed 6%  23%  42%  29% 341 
Developing 3%  13%  43%  41% 132 
Capacity  Developed 3%  23%  47%  27% 341 
Developing 3%  19%  35%  43%  132 
New 
opportunities 
Developed 3%  19%  47%  31% 338 
Developing 2%  11%  30%  58%  132 
 
                                                 
6 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php    8
 
How big a role should the following criteria play in allocating adaptation funds? 
  Region  No role  Limited  Considerable  Very considerable  Respondents 
Vulnerability  Developed 3%  9%  38%  50%  328 
Developing 3% 3%  38%  56%  131 
Need  Developed 5%  27%  51%  17% 326 
Developing 3%  17%  41%  39% 130 
Cost 
efficiency 
Developed 3%  27%  46%  24% 327 
Developing 5%  19%  45%  32% 128 
Even 
distribution 
Developed 37%  45%  14% 4%  327 
Developing 28% 32%  23% 18%  130 
Performance 
& capacity 
Developed 4%  27%  47%  22% 329 
Developing 4%  17%  38%  41%  129 
 
The survey invited respondents to provide additional comments on the questions asked.7 On 
adaptation, many comments highlighted that the chief challenge was that “absorptive capacity is high 
in some countries, … but these are not likely to be the hot-spots of vulnerability, like Sub-Saharan 
Africa or small islands.” Therefore, “effective spending of short-term finance is contingent on major 
capacity building,” and there is a premium on strengthening accountability. Additional allocation 
criteria proposed included funding shovel-ready projects and co-benefits in job creation or ecosystem 
services. 
In allocating funds for emissions reductions, many respondents considered cost-effectiveness to be the 
most important factor, but noted that it can be “at odds with developing new technologies, which will 
likely be inefficient at first – so balance will have to be the goal.” They considered that the relative 
weight of these criteria might have to shift over time. Respondents thought that in addition to 
characteristics measured in governance indicators, important dimensions of ‘capacity’ included 
monitoring capacity and the track record in implementing national development plans and PRSPs8. 
Possible additional allocation criteria included: development co-benefits; recipient ownership of plans; 
and supporting countries ready to systematically integrate low-carbon growth into their development 
plans. 
 
                                                 
7 See section two for details on the number of comments received, etc. 
8 http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp    9
1.3  Building an international architecture for implementation: appetite for innovation 
The survey asked which institutions should manage international cooperation and especially financial 
transfers. It also considered which governance arrangements should be used in overseeing their work. 
The need to find effective mechanisms for these tasks will loom large in delivering the emissions 
reduction and adaptation investment the world needs. Due to slow overall progress in the negotiations, 
however, ideas about institutional roles and the governance options for implementation remain poorly 
defined. 
All participants, and in particularly those from developing countries, generally had more positive views 
on the prospect of involving a given institution in delivering climate assistance than on current and 
possible future governance arrangements. Respondents’ comments suggested that this trend might be 
consistent with immediate concern to ensure effective delivery of enough assistance, along with 
disenchantment with the current governance of international institutions. 
Average share of options given top two ratings 
 
 
Institution should play 
considerable/very considerable role 
Governance approach is 
good/excellent 
Developed 61%  37% 
Developing 73%  46% 
 
1.3.1 Institutions: broad involvement, reform, and a new coordination function? 
Despite their generally supportive attitude toward most institutions, respondents tended to feel more 
favorable toward new and innovative mechanisms for delivering assistance than toward existing 
institutions. Among institutional options, the idea of a new UNFCCC “World Climate Fund”9 had the 
most support (the only proposal where “very broad responsibilities” was the modal choice – 50%) and 
the most detractors (the largest share to think the UN institution should not play any role – 17%) – 
with opponents coming primarily from developed countries. All participants viewed favorably the 
approach of delegating implementation responsibilities to accredited domestic institutions in 
developing countries. Involving bilateral agencies met with little support among both groups, while 
their attitudes toward current multilateral organizations diverged. Developing-country respondents 
felt much more positive toward the UN and regional development banks than their developed-country 
peers and less favorable towards the World Bank, while developed country respondents favored the 
World Bank over the UN and the regional banks. Developed-country participants felt positively about 
                                                 
9 This is the wording that was used in the survey question.   10
hybrid instruments like the World Bank-managed Climate Investment Funds (CIF) or the UNFCCC-
overseen Adaptation Fund. Developing-country respondents viewed them similarly as they did the UN 
or regional banks. 
Comments mostly circled around the question 
of whether a new World Climate Fund should 
be established. Strikingly, most respondents, 
regardless of their opinion on a new fund, 
evaluated the idea against the alternative of a 
system largely administered by the World 
Bank. Thus, those in favor of a new 
organization often felt that the scale of action 
needed required dedicated capacity, but also 
tended to argue that “due to the mistrust to the 
Bretton Woods institutions in developing 
countries … a new fund with its own secretariat is needed.” Some were particularly concerned that the 
Bank’s role in funding coal power undermined its credibility in delivering climate funds. Yet, others 
worried whether “we can spare the time to build a new World Climate Fund,” noted that setting it up 
might require “a great amount of resources that could be used to improve the climate change effects,” 
and feared lack of buy-in from contributors. 
Many comments sought middle ground. A number focused on the need to establish a coordination 
function. Indeed, many who favored a new climate organization viewed its role primarily in 
overseeing the efforts of diverse players “involved in implementation according to their comparative 
advantages.” In addition, many emphasized the need to reform existing institutions. Thus, one 
respondent thought that “overlaying new institutions on existing ones because of lack of trust or 
control is the wrong idea.” Rather, “existing mechanisms, like the World Bank, which have the 
resources and capacity to be helpful need to be retooled so that they are making better decisions (i.e., 
not funding new coal fired thermal generation).” Others noted that such reform could complement the 
approach of giving a larger role to UNFCCC-accredited domestic institutions. While comments were 
universally positive on this approach, some cautioned that “the UNFCCC has got to be holier than the 
Pope in accrediting domestic institutions in developing countries. This is no time for a wishy-washy 
UN to pander to politics.” 
 
Which institutions should play a "considerable" or 
"very considerable" role in managing climate-related 
financial flows? 
  Developed countries    Developing countries 
1 New  World  Climate 
Fund 
1 New  World  Climate 
Fund 
2 Hybrid  instruments  2 Accredited  domestic 
institutions 
3 Accredited  domestic 
institutions 
3 Hybrid  instruments 
4 Other  MDBs  4 Other  MDBs 
5 World  Bank  5 UN 
6 UN  6 World  Bank 
7 Bilaterals  7 Bilaterals   11
1.3.2 Governance: need for compromise. 
Divergences between developing and developed-country respondents in their attitudes toward 
different governance models were considerable. It is striking that, when pooling observations from 
both groups, a plurality thought that all but one possible arrangement should “not be considered at all.” 
By far the most popular arrangement, and the only one to meet with approval from both groups, was a 
CIF-like approach, where developing and developed countries hold equal numbers of board seats, and 
decision-making is by consensus. Developing-country respondents in particular favored this idea. 
Indeed, more developing-country respondents felt that a CIF-like arrangement was at least “good” 
(62%) than held this view on a UN-like arrangement (57%), and fewer felt it “should not be considered 
at all.” 
Respondents were nearly unanimous in their rejection of shareholder voting and in viewing weighted 
shareholder voting (by the inverse of per-capita emissions) skeptically. A ‘one country, one vote’ 
approach was quite popular with developing-country respondents, but not with developed-country 
participants. Disagreement was somewhat less sharp on an arrangement like the Adaptation Fund 
Board, where developing countries hold a majority of board seats, but fewer than are required for 
decision-making. (The survey’s description of this approach as a “blocking minority” was regrettable in 
retrospect, and may well have unduly biased the answers.) 
In their comments, respondents generally noted that the key challenge of making governance 
arrangements legitimate in the eyes of both contributors and recipients was well-known from the aid 
debate. However, an interesting common reaction was that respondents did not necessarily discuss the 
issue along the familiar battle lines of ‘one country, one vote’ versus shareholder voting. Rather, much 
attention focused on designing governance arrangements appropriate for the specific task of governing 
climate funds. This reasoning led many to support a CIF-like compromise. Some commented favorably 
on the idea of weighted shareholder voting, noting that the approach would reward developing 
countries for their actions to keep per-capita emissions low. Others proposed that weighting could also 
be carried out by vulnerability to climate impacts, (giving those with the most to lose a larger say), or a 
country’s potential for emission reductions (making sure countries where most progress is possible 
consider themselves well-represented). Yet, others cautioned that weighted shareholder voting was 
“too complex and susceptible to political influence. If used we would spend more time arguing over the 
ratios than working on climate change.” 
   12
How favorably do you view the following governance arrangements? 
     Excellent  Good  Adequate  Do not consider  Respondents 
One country, one 
vote 
Developed 12%  23%  25%  40%  295 
Developing  34%  23% 23%  21%  120 
Adaptation Fund-
like 
Developed 7%  33%  31% 28%  286 
Developing 15%  25%  22%  37%  118 
Climate Investment 
Funds-like 
Developed 18%  36%  30% 16%  294 
Developing  34%  29% 24%  14%  119 
Shareholder voting  Developed 7%  17%  27%  49%  290 
Developing 9%  13%  22%  56%  116 
Weighted 
shareholder 
Developed 11%  22%  24%  43%  290 
Developing 24%  24%  20%  31%  119 
 
2. Technical discussion and data 
2.0  Sample collection and incomplete responses 
The survey was posted on CGD’s website on November 19, 2009, when invitations to participate were 
sent to 4,321 subscribers to CGD’s climate newsletter. About 60% of all responses were received over 
the next two days. An additional invitation to take the survey was sent to 16,782 subscribers to the 
Center’s weekly newsletter on  November 24, 2009. Data was retrieved for analysis at 1am EST on 
November 28, at which time there were 479 completed surveys and 72 partly completed surveys. The 
survey remains on line at time of publication of this paper as an educational tool.10 However, responses 
are no longer being analyzed. (The survey questions are listed at the end of this paper.) 
A certain share of those who began taking the survey (13%) abandoned it after answering the questions 
on the first page (Action and Burden Sharing). This is not surprising: the survey was more technical 
and time-consuming than many other online surveys. Developing-country respondents were 
significantly more likely to abandon the survey after the first page (19%) than respondents born or 
resident in developed countries (10%). Those who exited the survey provided no demographic 
information beyond the countries where they were born and now live. Hence, it is not possible to 
investigate bias in incomplete answers beyond country of origin and residency. 
We find very little evidence that those who abandoned the survey after filling in the first page 
answered the initial questions differently than respondents who submitted a more complete set of 
answers. Only on offsets is there very limited evidence that those who abandoned the survey may have 
                                                 
10 http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=LQK6CTZ1Bf6RnNcqYijK0w_3d_3d 
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been less likely than others to favor limiting offset use. In particular, there is no evidence that 
respondents who would soon abandon the survey simply picked the first option (this is a concern 
because options were not randomized in the survey – although of course no default choice was 
suggested). We therefore include all respondents who have answered a given question in summary 
statistics. Excluding them commonly changes mean values by about 1%. We do not include the 
observations in models explaining choices, since no complete set of demographic variables is available 
for them. 
A total of 124 respondents (26% of respondents) used one or more of the open fields to provide 
comments, and the number of comments per open field ranged from 31 to 69. In total, 362 comments 
were received, for an average of about three comments per person who commented. A larger share of 
developing-country respondents (32%) than developed-country respondents commented. Two 
respondents used the open fields to state their belief that climate change was not in fact happening, or 
to otherwise dispute the scientific consensus on global warming. 
 
2.1 Analytical strategy 
Where survey choices were binary, we used probit models to estimate how demographic variables 
influenced the likelihood of choices; where the survey offered more than two categorical choices, we 
used (maximum likelihood) multinomial logit models to estimate how demographics influenced the 
likelihood that respondents chose a given alternative to the modal response. Where there were more 
than two choices with a natural ordinal meaning (for instance, increasing levels of funding), we 
present results from ordered logistic regressions. We coded all dependent variables so that higher 
values (and in the attached tables, greater coefficients) indicate stronger preference for the proposition 
at issue. We tested robustness of ordered logit results by estimating a probit model, coding the 
dependent variable 0 and 1 for the two most adverse and most positive choices, respectively, as well as 
by estimating GLS over imputed values. We omit results from robustness checks for conciseness. 
We explored the association between demographics and choice in two model specifications. An 
extended model included country groups, academic training, discipline trained in, employer type, 
gender, age, and information on whether respondents work professionally on the climate change or the 
environment. Given the limited sample size, we also considered a sparser model that includes only 
country groups, discipline trained in, gender, and information on professional work on climate or the 
environment. Both specifications were tested with a simple breakdown of respondents into developing   14
and developed country groups, and in five regional groups (U.S.; other developed countries; BRICS plus 
Mexico and Korea; other developing countries; Africa.). 
In the present analysis, where we made positive statements on relationships between choices and 
demographic background, we wanted to imply that the hypothesis stated was significant at least at the  
90% level, in the two models, as well as in a univariate context and in simple distribution-free tests 
(Chi-square tests and rank-sum or sign-rank tests, as appropriate). Where we stated that there may be a 
relationship, we wanted to indicate that the association whose statistical significance was not entirely 
robust. 
 
2.2 What kind of action from which countries? 
Tables 1.1-1.5 present regression results for the survey questions on action to limit climate change. 
Significance patterns were generally thin. We leave it to the reader to peruse the tables, and note here 
only some results that strike us as interesting. 
Economists were more likely than scientists and engineers  to favor binding portfolios of actions from 
advanced developing countries over non-binding goals. Those working on the environment may have 
been more likely than others to favor intensity targets or soft caps over binding targets. 
On offsets, BRICS+ respondents may have 
been more likely than U.S. respondents to 
oppose any offset use. Developing countries 
show up in the sparse model (using fewer 
variables) as being more likely to oppose any 
offsets. We acknowledge this result to avoid 
confusing readers who consult the table, but 
do not put much stake in it: it was not 
significant under any other specification, or in distribution-free tests. The inset table illustrates that 
there is reason to believe that the result is driven by lower enthusiasm for capping offsets, rather than 
purely by enthusiasm for prohibiting them entirely. 
As regards willingness to pay for a hypothetical guarantee that there would never be dangerous climate 
change, developing and developed-country respondents showed similar values at the mean and at the 
median (quantile regression results omitted for conciseness), although those from Africa and BRICS+ 
may have had lower median willingness to pay. Developing-country respondents overall were more 
  Developed Developing 
No offsets  19%  21% 
Unlimited amounts of 
offsets 11%  12% 
Offsets up to a certain 
percentage of 
developed-country 
commitments 42%  35% 
Offsets are permitted, 
but a discount factor is 
applied. 28%  33%   15
pessimistic than others about the cost of avoiding dangerous climate change, as were those who 
professionally work on the environment. Scientists and engineers, as well as social scientists other than 
economists showed considerably higher willingness to pay than other professional groups. 
 
2.2 Funding allocation, governance and institutions 
Ordered logit results immediately reflect the divergence between developing and developed-country 
respondents on the question of what amounts of funding would be equitable and useful. (Table 2) 
Interestingly, those trained in the sciences and engineering (and to a lesser degree, social scientists 
other than economists) were consistently more l i k e l y  t o  f a v o r  h i g h  a d aptation funding than 
economists, perhaps reflecting different relative importance these two professional groups attached to 
climate impacts and to capacity constraints. 
Developing-country respondents were more likely to think that past performance and opening up new 
opportunities should play a role. These results largely held across more disaggregated country groups. 
On adaptation funding, developed-country respondents were less likely to favor need, an even 
distribution of funds, but also past performance. (Tables 3.1-3.2) 
In addition to the main results presented above, we find (Table 4.2) that among regional groups, U.S. 
respondents tended to feel most adversely toward the UN, African respondents were the most likely to 
view a CIF-like arrangement positively, and African and BRICS+ respondents tended to take an 
interest in weighted shareholder voting. Scientists tended to favor, a CIF approach; climate 
professionals tended to disfavor it. Concerning institutions, (Table 4.1) all regional groups favored the 
UN, a new climate fund, and accrediting domestic institutions more than U.S. respondents did. African 
respondents consistently thought of all institutions, including bilaterals, more highly than other 
respondents. 
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Four or fewer respondents: 
  
1 USA  219   Argentina Japan  Belarus  Finland Singapore 
2 India  24   Denmark Morocco Bolivia  Ghana  Slovakia 
3 Canada  22 
 
New Zealand  Netherlands  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Guatemala Taiwan 
4 Australia  19 
 
Senegal Norway  Botswana  Guyana  Trinidad 
and Tobago 
5 UK  19   Sweden Pakistan  Brazil  Kenya  Ukraine 
6 Germany  8   Bangladesh Portugal  Burundi  Liberia  Uruguay 
7 Indonesia  8 
 
Cameroon Republic  of 
Korea 
Cambodia Malawi   
8 France  7   Hungary Spain  China  Malaysia   
9 Philippines  7   Iran Switzerland  Colombia  Mexico   
10 Belgium  6   Nepal Turkey  Congo  Mozambique   
11 Ireland  6   South Africa  Uganda Cuba  Namibia   
12 Peru  6 
 





13 Ethiopia  5   Viet Nam  Zambia  Ecuador  Papua New Guinea 
14 Italy  5   Greece Algeria  Egypt  Romania   
15 Nigeria  5   Hong Kong  Austria  Estonia  Rwanda   







Four or fewer respondents: 
  
1 USA  174   Argentina Denmark Ireland  Saint  Lucia  Zambia 




Jamaica Senegal  Zimbabwe 
3 Canada  24   Austria Ecuador  Japan  Singapore   
4 India  24   Bangladesh Egypt  Kenya  Slovakia   
5 Australia  20   Belarus El  Salvador  Malawi Somalia   
6 Germany  13   Bermuda Estonia  Malaysia  South  Africa   




Finland Mexico  Spain   
8 Belgium  8   Brazil Ghana  Morocco  Sri  Lanka   
9 Netherlands  6   Bulgaria Greece  Mozambique  Sudan   
10 Nigeria  6   Burundi Guatemala  New  Caledonia  Sweden  
11 Ethiopia  5   Cambodia Guyana  Nicaragua Taiwan   
12 Indonesia  5   Cameroon Haiti  Norway  Turkey   
13 Italy  5   China Honduras  Pakistan  Uganda   





Costa Rica  Hungary  Portugal  U.S. Virgin Islands 
16 Philippines  5 
 
Cuba Iceland  Republic  of 
Korea 
Uruguay  
17 Switzerland  5   DR Congo  Iran  Romania  Venezuela   17
Annex 2: Sub-sample of professional affiliations. 
At the end of the survey, participants were invited to voluntarily state their professional affiliation (the survey 
explicitly stated that this was not a required field). Of the 479 respondents, 117 followed the invitation. 
A ready-to-wear factory  gtz  Investment fund supporting non-bankable 
projects 
ACDI/VOCA Harvard  University  RAKIYA  HOSPITAL 
AEI HDFC  Bank Retired
Africa Center for Strategic Studies  Helen Keller International (2)  Retired Environmental Scientist from 
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai 
Agrarian Research Foundation, Bangladesh  Himalayan Institute of Development  Retired natural resources scientist 
Agricultural and Natural resources Research 
centre of Kurdistan, Iran 
ICRISAT  Retired part time consulting 
American Institutes for Research  IFAD  Retired PhD chemist 
AusAID Independent  Consultant Retired, active member many boards. 
Active on geoengineering with a global 
scientific academy. 
Belgian Technical Cooperation  Instructor Rural Education and Environment 
Development Service(REEDS) 
Bengal Enterprises,LLC  International Development Research Centre Self (3)
Bread for the World  IOM  Solar company 
CARE Peru  John Swire & Sons (HK) Ltd State of Alaska 
CEIP  La Trobe University School of Public Health  Student, Clinton School of Public Service 
Center for Health Policy and Innovation  McGill University Student, Harvard College 
Centre analyse stratégique  Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd  The University of Zambia 
CGD Millennium  Challenge  Corporation Think  tank
CNRS (France)  Ministry of Development Co-operation  Trade association 
Commonwealth Associaton-Uganda  Ministry of Education Jamaica  Transparency International Bangladesh 
Corporate Council on Africa  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
CSR and sustainable development  Ministry of Health  Universidad Politécnica de Nicaragua 
Department of Agrarian Reform  Ministry of Local Development, Nepal  University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria 
Droits Humains Sans Frontieres  MIT Sloan  University of Guelph 
EBRD  National Agricultural Innovation Project, 
Government of India 
University of Guyana 
Emory University  National Ombudsman  University of Maryland - College Park 
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory  National University of Rwanda University of Maryland- Student
Finnish bilateral aid  National Wildlife Federation  University of Montana 
FOMICRES - Mozambican Force for Crime 
Investigation and Social Reinsertion 
NGO Hygie-Enwerem Foundation University of South Australia 
Foreign Ministry  Northwestern Oklahoma State University US
Founder  and MD of an NGO working on 
Brain-Gain 
Nottingham University  US Department of State 
Frontier Economics  Own a business developing green energy 
projects in Indonesia (PT GA Listrik) 
VSA-COSCTAS 
Gandhigram Trust, Tamilnadu, India  Oxford Instruments PLC WFP
Geonuclear, Inc  Oxygen Marketing Agency  Wolaita Development Association 
Global Washington  Planning Commission of Pakistan World Bank (4) 
Google Private  School 
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Table 1.1: Preferences on setting targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
    
Targets for advanced 
developing countries 
(base: binding caps 
today) 
Targets for advanced 
developing countries 




































 Probit  Probit  Multinomial  logit  Multinom.  Logit  Probit  Probit 
Developing 0.0165    -0.121  -0.306      0.0750   
 (0.0839)    (-0.499)  (-0.540)      (0.310)   
other  developed   -0.372*      -0.0489  -0.533   0.995***
    (-1.749)     (-0.192)  (-0.912)   (3.601) 
BRICS+   -0.300     0.460  0.657   0.239 
    (-0.845)     (1.053)  (0.835)   (0.685) 
other  developing    -0.191     -0.218 -1.407    0.638* 
    (-0.657)     (-0.612)  (-1.270)   (1.747) 
Africa    0.00817     -0.666  -1.309   1.002 
    (0.0252)     (-1.517)  (-1.159)   (1.612) 
Science/engineering  -0.195  -0.191  0.138 -1.552*  0.142 -1.562*  0.260 0.304 
  (-0.791)  (-0.766)  (0.460)  (-1.912) (0.470)  (-1.911) (0.897)  (0.997) 
Other soc. Science  -0.205  -0.250  -0.0559  -0.669  -0.0335  -0.640  0.0204  0.00680
  (-0.800)  (-0.957) (-0.182) (-1.048)  (-0.108) (-0.988)  (0.0671) (0.0217)
Management 0.150  0.126 0.0760  -1.026  0.0579  -1.107  0.168 0.230 
  (0.581)  (0.484)  (0.224)  (-1.253) (0.169)  (-1.340) (0.491)  (0.643) 
Other -0.147  -0.175  -0.0216  -1.338  -0.0106  -1.406  0.389  0.469 
  (-0.460) (-0.547)  (-0.0570) (-1.230)  (-0.0276) (-1.281)  (0.935)  (1.044) 
Male  0.563***  0.568*** -0.0981 0.625 -0.0635 0.765 0.0721  -0.0964
  (2.692) (2.702)  (-0.432) (1.048)  (-0.277) (1.268)  (0.315)  (-0.395)
Climate 
professional  -0.0850  -0.0874 -0.0583 0.528 -0.134  0.339 -0.428*  -0.401 
  (-0.405)  (-0.409) (-0.234) (0.966)  (-0.530) (0.605)  (-1.831) (-1.632)
Environmental 
professional  -0.0688  -0.0884  0.501** 0.485  0.592** 0.709  0.0917 0.0688 
  (-0.341) (-0.429)  (2.073)  (0.876) (2.387)  (1.258) (0.394)  (0.281) 
Constant  -1.505***  -1.308***  -0.176 -2.420***  -0.186 -2.284***  0.652**  0.307 
  (-6.252)  (-4.994) (-0.639) (-3.734)  (-0.605) (-3.211)  (2.296)  (0.993) 
Observations  380  380 380 380  380 380  175 175 
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Table 1.2: Preferences on offset use 
 (7)  (8) 
  Offsets (base: permitted but capped)  Offsets (base: permitted but capped) 









  Multinomial logit  Multinomial logit 
Developing  0.607*  0.314 0.465      
  (1.823) (0.782) (1.609)      
other developed        0.165  -0.165  -0.249 
     (0.453) (-0.388)  (-0.821)
BRICS+       1.595***  0.533  1.081* 
     (2.655) (0.668)  (1.948)
other developing        0.619  0.102  0.246 
       (1.255)  (0.167)  (0.584) 
Africa       -0.289  0.207  -0.149 
       (-0.405)  (0.324)  (-0.292) 
Science/engineering  0.526  -0.535 -0.236 0.540  -0.517 -0.224 
  (1.286)  (-1.129) (-0.632) (1.310)  (-1.089) (-0.598) 
Other  soc.  Science  -0.0310  -0.490 0.134  0.0211 -0.485 0.146 
  (-0.0693)  (-0.995) (0.376)  (0.0467) (-0.978) (0.408) 
Management  1.018** 0.253  0.849** 1.043** 0.256  0.828** 
  (2.108) (0.460) (2.049) (2.134) (0.464) (1.983) 
Other  -0.908 -2.294**  -0.474 -0.883 -2.306**  -0.487 
  (-1.467) (-2.152) (-1.084) (-1.414) (-2.161) (-1.101) 
Male -0.229  1.626*** -0.289 -0.201 1.644***  -0.239
  (-0.728) (2.912)  (-1.088) (-0.631) (2.932)  (-0.888) 
Climate 
professional  0.457 0.323 0.285 0.330 0.286 0.201 
  (1.313) (0.770) (0.969) (0.933) (0.675) (0.671) 
Environmental 
professional  -0.570*  -0.499 -0.0114  -0.438 -0.492 0.0600 
 (-1.645)  (-1.206) (-0.0399) (-1.246) (-1.167)  (0.206)
Constant -1.026***  -2.239*** -0.492  -1.161*** -2.159*** -0.402 
  (-2.653) (-3.787) (-1.527) (-2.656) (-3.434) (-1.123) 
Observations  380 380 380 380 380 380 
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Table 1.3: Preferences on reporting and verification 
 (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
    
Verification for emissions 
reductions (base: international 
third-party) 
Verification for emissions 

















  Probit  Probit  Multinomial logit  Multinomial logit 
Developing  0.234   0.307 0.0417     
 (0.732)    (0.471)  (0.128)     
other developed    0.282      0.432  -0.340 
   (0.888) (0.571)  (-0.968)
BRICS+   0.0123      -33.35  -0.0240 
   (0.0285) (-1.41e-06)  (-0.0433)
other developing    0.522      0.564  -0.604 
   (1.024)      (0.592)  (-1.125) 
Africa   (dropped)     1.261  0.358 
         (1.260)  (0.697) 
Science/engineering  -0.446  -0.486  0.698 -0.132  0.718 -0.125 
 (-1.087)  (-1.135)  (0.747)  (-0.315)  (0.766)  (-0.297) 
Other soc. Science  -0.231  -0.273  1.069  0.212  1.110  0.201 
 (-0.542)  (-0.621)  (1.196)  (0.520)  (1.225)  (0.488) 
Management  -0.826* -0.849* -0.0687  0.0372  0.106  -0.000584 
 (-1.959)  (-1.923)  (-0.0551)  (0.0809)  (0.0842)  (-0.00126) 
Other  (dropped)  (dropped) 1.039 0.0323  1.009 -0.0119 
     (1.002)  (0.0613)  (0.966)  (-0.0225) 
Male  -0.0776  -0.124  0.774 0.638*  0.715 0.642* 
 (-0.263)  (-0.415)  (1.106)  (1.890)  (1.013)  (1.886) 
Climate 
professional  -0.800** -0.835** -1.066  -0.0350  -0.930  -0.0305 
  (-2.534)  (-2.498)  (-1.269) (-0.104)  (-1.107) (-0.0890) 
Environmental 
professional 0.531  0.502  -0.0894  0.0124  -0.250  -0.00462 
 (1.620)  (1.444) (-0.130) (0.0376) (-0.354)  (-0.0137)
Constant 2.299***  2.258***  -4.186***  -2.173***  -4.398***  -1.994*** 
  (5.686)  (5.234)  (-4.451) (-5.404)  (-4.140) (-4.562) 
Observations  339  313  380 380  380 380 
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Table 1.4: Preferences on trade measures 
 (13)  (14) 
 
Trade measures (base: only allowed in 
narrow circumstances) 
Trade measures (base: only allowed in 
narrow circumstances) 
VARIABLES  Always permitted  Never permitted  Always permitted  Never permitted 
       
Developing 0.167  0.423     
 (0.645)  (1.140)     
other developed      0.253  0.355 
   (0.928) (0.816) 
BRICS+     0.219  0.941 
   (0.472) (1.587) 
other developing      0.348  0.126 
     (0.924)  (0.198) 
Africa     0.303 0.801 
     (0.646)  (1.273) 
Science/engineering  0.241 -0.352  0.239 -0.353 
  (0.759) (-0.719)  (0.753) (-0.718) 
Other soc. Science  -0.532  -0.882*  -0.515  -0.818 
 (-1.582)  (-1.667)  (-1.523)  (-1.532) 
Management  0.240 -0.0613  0.278 -0.0200 
  (0.664) (-0.117)  (0.763) (-0.0380) 
Other -0.0608  0.0277  -0.0452  0.0292 
 (-0.149)  (0.0500)  (-0.111)  (0.0524) 
Male 0.110  0.000548 0.0963 -0.0233 
  (0.449) (0.00148)  (0.389) (-0.0621) 
Climate 
professional -0.150  0.106  -0.145  0.0800 
 (-0.548)  (0.266)  (-0.523)  (0.197) 
Environmental 
professional -0.335  0.0197  -0.341  0.0451 
 (-1.270)  (0.0501) (-1.272) (0.113) 
Constant -0.395  -1.544***  -0.528  -1.737*** 
 (-1.335)  (-3.557)  (-1.600)  (-3.442) 
Observations  376 376  376 376 
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Table 1.5: Willingness to pay and expected cost 
 (15)  (16)  (19)  (20)  (23)  (24) 
           
VARIABLES Willingness  to  pay 
Expected cost of 
effective action 
Expect cost greater than 
willingness to pay? 
  OLS OLS OLS  OLS  Probit  Probit 
Developing -1.867   5.150***    -0.564***   
 (-0.945)    (3.011)    (-3.312)   
other  developed   2.012    2.747*   0.181 
   (0.960) (1.902) (0.948) 
BRICS+   -2.856    2.928    -0.322 
   (-0.896) (1.369) (-1.096) 
other  developing   -2.353    5.492**   -0.568** 
   (-1.075)    (2.587)    (-2.314) 
Africa   3.753    13.03***   -0.482 
   (0.768)    (3.316)    (-1.571) 
Science/engineering  7.398*** 7.467*** 1.232  1.243  -0.0196  -0.0251 
  (2.733) (2.764) (0.629)  (0.646)  (-0.0905)  (-0.116) 
Other soc. Science  1.961  2.132  2.069  2.211  -0.147  -0.117 
  (1.269) (1.349) (1.015)  (1.087)  (-0.663)  (-0.522) 
Management  3.513 3.813 -2.033 -1.715 0.245  0.263 
  (1.338) (1.461) (-1.104) (-0.952) (0.966)  (1.032) 
Other  7.601**  7.649**  2.851 2.873 -0.0857  -0.0899 
  (2.046) (2.060) (1.097)  (1.153)  (-0.305)  (-0.319) 
Male -1.439  -1.741 -2.748 -3.183* 0.00107 0.00262 
  (-0.752) (-0.910) (-1.571)  (-1.822)  (0.00636)  (0.0156) 
Climate 
professional  3.351 3.792 -2.237 -1.534 0.344*  0.337* 
  (1.446) (1.606) (-1.451) (-1.034) (1.855)  (1.779) 
Environmental 
professional  1.378 0.936 3.866** 3.179*  -0.383**  -0.370** 
 (0.651)  (0.428) (2.388) (1.959) (-2.131) (-2.025) 
Constant  8.717*** 7.758*** 7.853***  6.673***  0.894***  0.792*** 
  (4.588) (3.219) (3.588)  (3.306)  (4.402)  (3.424) 
Observations  355 355 330  330  321  321 
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Table 2: Funding action 










VARIABLES  Ordered logit  Ordered logit  Ordered logit  Ordered logit 
Developing 0.678***    0.505**   
 (3.173)    (2.248)   
other developed    0.776***    0.486** 
   (3.323)    (2.063) 
BRICS+   1.078*** 0.232 
   (2.762)    (0.579) 
other developing   1.145*** 0.646* 
   (3.665)    (1.952) 
Africa   1.033***   1.459*** 
   (2.711)    (3.699) 
Science/engineering  0.0806 0.0782 0.954***  0.953*** 
  (0.300) (0.290) (3.350)  (3.338) 
Other soc. Science  0.153  0.225  0.927***  0.980*** 
  (0.569) (0.827) (3.243)  (3.401) 
Management 0.0338  0.106  0.455  0.493 
  (0.110) (0.344) (1.487)  (1.594) 
Other  -0.290 -0.250 0.444  0.480 
  (-0.874) (-0.743) (1.298)  (1.400) 
Male -0.0721  -0.136 -0.189  -0.260 
 (-0.359)  (-0.672) (-0.903) (-1.231) 
Climate 
professional  0.347 0.368 0.231  0.311 
  (1.537) (1.608) (0.997)  (1.320) 
Environmental 
professional -0.104  -0.110 -0.0550 -0.156 
  (-0.480) (-0.497) (-0.243)  (-0.674) 
Constant  (cut omitted)  (cut omitted) (cut omitted)  
       
Observations  376 376 352  352 
       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3.1: Allocating funds to support emissions reductions (ordered logit estimates) 
 Cost  efficiency  Even  distribution  Past performance  Capacity  New opportunities 
V A R I A B L E S             
            
Developing  0.0394   0.312**   0.422***   0.254**   0.587***   
  (0.294)   (2.441)   (3.238)   (1.964)   (4.365)  
other  developed   -0.214   0.495***   0.127   -0.0791   0.175 
   (-1.519)   (3.659)   (0.955)   (-0.594)   (1.307) 
BRICS+   -0.508**   0.994***   0.422*   0.425*   0.731*** 
   (-2.190)   (4.398)   (1.865)   (1.841)   (3.078) 
other  developing   0.128   0.339*   0.403**   -0.0975   0.461** 
   (0.633)   (1.806)   (2.118)   (-0.525)   (2.413) 
Africa   0.0850   0.521**   0.713***   0.570**   1.057*** 
   (0.351)   (2.271)   (3.002)   (2.340)   (4.102) 
Science/engineering 0.0789  0.0746  0.384**  0.397**  0.474***  0.473***  0.0415  0.0508  0.343**  0.349** 
  (0.464) (0.437) (2.427) (2.495) (2.966) (2.955) (0.263) (0.321) (2.130) (2.163) 
Other soc. Science  -0.117  -0.166  0.306*  0.388**  0.140  0.153  0.00623  0.0209  0.257  0.289* 
  (-0.686)  (-0.964)  (1.911) (2.392) (0.881) (0.954) (0.0388)  (0.129) (1.576) (1.758) 
Management -0.514***  -0.549***  0.374**  0.448**  0.103  0.116  -0.0794  -0.0896  0.0966  0.115 
  (-2.768)  (-2.937)  (2.075) (2.459) (0.580) (0.651) (-0.443)  (-0.497)  (0.532) (0.631) 
Other  -0.253  -0.263  0.689***  0.739***  0.238 0.246 0.122 0.115 0.259 0.267 
  (-1.218)  (-1.257)  (3.442) (3.663) (1.186) (1.222) (0.605) (0.568) (1.266) (1.298) 
Male  0.257**  0.264**  -0.230*  -0.254** -0.246** -0.266** -0.0394 -0.0458 -0.252** -0.280** 
  (2.040)  (2.071)  (-1.926) (-2.105) (-2.035) (-2.190) (-0.328) (-0.378) (-2.050) (-2.255) 
Climate professional  -0.00624  0.0332  0.0788  0.0400  -0.143  -0.131  -0.247*  -0.259*  -0.0844  -0.0786 
  (-0.0454)  (0.240)  (0.606)  (0.302)  (-1.102) (-0.995) (-1.888) (-1.951) (-0.638) (-0.587) 
Environmental  professional  -0.261* -0.307**  -0.0189  0.0252 0.0503 0.0357 0.213* 0.218* -0.00376  -0.0118 
  (-1.947)  (-2.262)  (-0.149)  (0.195) (0.396) (0.278) (1.667) (1.676) (-0.0292)  (-0.0901) 
Observations  380 380 377 377 380 380 381 381 379 379 
            
Cuts omitted.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             25
Table 3.2: Allocating funds to support emissions reductions (ordered logit estimates) 
 Vulnerability    Need    Cost  efficiency  Even  distribution  Past  performance 
VARIABLES               
               
Developing 0.124    0.583***    0.242*    0.601***    0.434***   
 (0.919)    (4.489)    (1.886)    (4.668)    (3.348)   
other developed    0.306**    0.272**    -0.326**    0.304**    -0.109 
   (2.162)    (2.026)    (-2.426)    (2.222)    (-0.818) 
BRICS+   -0.0856    0.862***    -0.0559    1.092***    0.339 
   (-0.374)    (3.766)    (-0.254)    (4.881)    (1.501) 
other developing    0.671***    0.541***    0.328*    0.522***    0.344* 
   (3.195)    (2.882)    (1.713)    (2.764)    (1.818) 
Africa   0.117    0.920***    -0.198    0.827***    0.477** 
   (0.496)    (3.864)    (-0.853)    (3.567)    (2.036) 
Science/engineering -0.328** -0.347**  0.206  0.207  0.0705 0.0724  0.338** 0.346** 0.113  0.116 
  (-1.963) (-2.063)  (1.291) (1.299) (0.446) (0.456) (2.109) (2.158) (0.715)  (0.732) 
Other  soc.  Science  0.00192  -0.00538  0.144 0.183 0.0212  -0.0212  0.212 0.262 0.0703 0.0604 
  (0.0111) (-0.0308)  (0.894) (1.130) (0.132) (-0.131)  (1.289) (1.586) (0.439)  (0.375) 
Management -0.204  -0.174  0.0333  0.0620  0.0341  0.00264  0.238  0.270  0.0717  0.0607 
  (-1.079)  (-0.911) (0.187)  (0.346)  (0.191)  (0.0147) (1.317)  (1.479)  (0.404)  (0.341) 
Other -0.246  -0.223  0.124  0.137  -0.0742  -0.0852  0.491**  0.508**  0.276  0.270 
  (-1.173) (-1.058)  (0.616) (0.682) (-0.365)  (-0.417)  (2.437) (2.511) (1.364)  (1.336) 
Male  -0.0875 -0.116 -0.197 -0.226*  0.182  0.222* -0.0519  -0.0721  -0.0876  -0.0846 
  (-0.687)  (-0.900) (-1.626) (-1.853) (1.514)  (1.825)  (-0.427) (-0.588) (-0.727)  (-0.698) 
Climate  professional  0.302**  0.338** 0.0546 0.0548 -0.292**  -0.297**  0.0450 0.0197 -0.344***  -0.339** 
  (2.136)  (2.357) (0.417) (0.413) (-2.239)  (-2.250)  (0.341) (0.147) (-2.633) (-2.569) 
Environmental 
professional  0.0728  0.0560 -0.131 -0.126 -0.186 -0.192 -0.185 -0.157 0.0717  0.0632 
 (0.537)  (0.407)  (-1.025)  (-0.977)  (-1.461)  (-1.479)  (-1.425)  (-1.193)  (0.565)  (0.492) 
Observations  381  381 378 378 377 377  378 378 379  379 
Cuts omitted.  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 





               
Developing  0.682***   0.0457   0.325**   -0.183    0.427***   
  (5.227)   (0.354)   (2.556)   (-1.327)    (3.288)   
other  developed   0.339**   -0.0277   -0.00522    -0.417***    0.230 
   (2.433)   (-0.201)   (-0.0389)    (-2.858)    (1.639) 
BRICS+  0.732***   0.293   0.360    -0.446*    0.997*** 
    (3.230)   (1.315)   (1.642)   (-1.786)    (4.390) 
other  developing   0.725***   -0.112   0.137    -0.378*    0.190 
   (3.764)   (-0.590)   (0.729)    (-1.879)    (0.986) 
Africa    1.250***   -0.0264   0.593**    -0.369    0.665*** 
   (5.327)   (-0.113)   (2.554)    (-1.516)    (2.822) 
Science/engineering  0.226 0.230 0.178 0.179 0.313**  0.315**  -0.178  -0.170  -0.167  -0.176 
  (1.396) (1.418) (1.116) (1.119) (1.981) (1.996) (-1.059)  (-1.010)  (-1.033)  (-1.079) 
Other  soc.  Science  -0.0116  0.0289  0.116 0.128 0.122 0.132 -0.286  -0.348*  -0.108  -0.0527 
  (-0.0697)  (0.172) (0.693) (0.760) (0.758) (0.813) (-1.607)  (-1.929)  (-0.651)  (-0.314) 
Management 0.0576  0.0987  0.211 0.204 0.134 0.140 -0.0402  -0.0856  -0.266  -0.252 
  (0.317) (0.539) (1.168) (1.118) (0.760) (0.788) (-0.215)  (-0.454)  (-1.426)  (-1.340) 
Other  0.308 0.328 0.514**  0.502**  0.311 0.304 -0.0603  -0.103  0.0549  0.0543 
  (1.504) (1.589) (2.496) (2.426) (1.521) (1.483) (-0.275)  (-0.466)  (0.269)  (0.264) 
Male  -0.253**  -0.295**  -0.114 -0.110 -0.178 -0.193 0.476***  0.508***  0.0369  0.0236 
  (-2.043) (-2.361) (-0.923) (-0.883) (-1.466) (-1.579) (3.523)  (3.709)  (0.295)  (0.188) 
Climate 
professional  -0.0602 -0.0346 0.0980  0.0689  -0.350***  -0.348***  -0.291**  -0.301**  -0.00918  -0.0587 
  (-0.445) (-0.252) (0.737)  (0.512)  (-2.674) (-2.625) (-2.030)  (-2.071)  (-0.0684)  (-0.431) 
Environmental 
professional  -0.146 -0.188 -0.107 -0.0819  -0.0431  -0.0552  0.278**  0.285**  -0.0533  -0.0257 
  (-1.100) (-1.392) (-0.817) (-0.617) (-0.340) (-0.429) (2.014)  (2.028)  (-0.404)  (-0.192) 
Observations  366 366 356 356 365 365 359  359  361  361 
Cuts omitted.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
   27
Table 4.2: Preferences on involving institutions in delivering climate funds (ordered logit). 






















                         
Developing 0.131    0.453***    0.298**   0.482***    0.365***   0.435***    0.620***   
  (1.038)    (3.496)    (2.323)   (3.759)   (2.676)   (3.395)    (4.647)   
other  developed    -0.284**    -0.107    -0.201   0.233*   0.529***    -0.0858   0.297** 
    (-2.122)    (-0.802)    (-1.500)    (1.735)   (3.683)   (-0.648)    (2.210) 
BRICS+   -0.277    0.264    -0.101    0.512**    0.765***    0.0462    0.785*** 
    (-1.252)    (1.162)    (-0.455)    (2.292)   (3.168)   (0.205)    (3.340) 
other  developing    -0.155   0.113    0.162    0.407**    0.432**    0.243   0.527*** 
    (-0.842)    (0.608)    (0.868)   (2.184)   (2.202)   (1.322)    (2.756) 
Africa    0.525**    1.132***    0.618**    1.088***   0.898***   1.123***    1.270*** 
    (2.265)    (4.553)    (2.560)   (4.547)   (3.509)   (4.593)    (5.027) 
Science/engineering -0.293*  -0.292*  0.000  0.008  -0.0145  -0.0178  0.426*** 0.434*** 0.354** 0.375**  0.116  0.120  0.297*  0.293* 
  (-1.872)  (-1.860)  (0.000)  (0.051)  (-0.0923) (-0.113)  (2.702) (2.748) (2.123)  (2.236) (0.745)  (0.769)  (1.880)  (1.852) 
Other  soc.  Science  -0.178  -0.212  0.156  0.155  -0.0392 -0.0781  0.406**  0.438***  0.177 0.257 0.403** 0.386**  0.695***  0.748*** 
  (-1.108)  (-1.310)  (0.966)  (0.955)  (-0.240)  (-0.475)  (2.491) (2.671) (1.035)  (1.484) (2.523)  (2.399)  (4.209)  (4.464) 
Management  -0.122  -0.149  0.231  0.230  -0.0719 -0.0969  0.262  0.297* 0.214 0.284 0.160  0.144  0.350*  0.383** 
  (-0.685)  (-0.833)  (1.295)  (1.281)  (-0.405)  (-0.542)  (1.471) (1.658) (1.148)  (1.511) (0.899)  (0.802)  (1.950)  (2.116) 
Other -0.132  -0.171  -0.141  -0.156  -0.129  -0.150  0.626***  0.653***  0.502** 0.595*** 0.451**  0.437**  0.507**  0.520** 
  (-0.664)  (-0.859)  (-0.702)  (-0.767)  (-0.649)  (-0.751)  (3.077) (3.189) (2.310)  (2.677) (2.236)  (2.155)  (2.493)  (2.548) 








0.489*** -0.00451 -0.0361  -0.185  -0.234* 
 (2.345)  (2.352)  (0.932)  (0.708)  (-0.583)  (-0.646)  (-2.795)  (-3.126) 
(-
3.327) (-3.668)  (-0.0379)  (-0.301)  (-1.519)  (-1.892) 
Climate 
professional  -0.486***  -0.458***  -0.258**  -0.229*  -0.135  -0.0978  0.116 0.153 0.159  0.168 0.0296 0.0863 0.0490  0.0778 
  (-3.724)  (-3.469)  (-1.961)  (-1.724)  (-1.031)  (-0.739)  (0.879) (1.143) (1.147)  (1.193) (0.229)  (0.656)  (0.370)  (0.581) 
Environmental 
professional  0.254**  0.206  0.201  0.162  0.0756  0.0271 0.0238 -0.0118  -0.146 -0.154 0.0851  0.0194  -0.0142  -0.0385 




1.082) (-1.117)  (0.671)  (0.151)  (-0.110)  (-0.294) 
Observations  375  375  375  375  372  372 370 370 372  372 373  373  369  369 
                         
C u t s   o m i t t e d .                        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                           



































































3. Funding Global Action to Reduce Emissions Growth  
 
1. The investment needed in developing countries to limit warming to two degrees is thought 
to be roughly several hundred billion dollars annually, some of which may be channeled 
through carbon markets (if for example private polluters offset their obligations by financing forest preservation). But additional funding is likely to be needed. Of developing country 
needs that are NOT covered through the carbon markets, what percentage should developed 
countries provide? 
  None 
 
  Up to 40 percent 
 
  40‐70 percent 
 
  More than 70 percent 
2. Some public money (government contributions; fees from auctions of permits) will likely 
be available to help developing countries reduce emissions growth. Climate negotiators will 
have to define a formula for allocating these funds to emission reduction actions that 
different developing countries propose.  
How important should the following criteria be? (Should not be a factor at all — Should play a 
limited role — Should play a considerable role — Should play a very considerable role) 
  Funding the most cost‐efficient emission reduction projects. 
  Even distribution of funds among countries (e.g., equal amounts per capita). 
  Rewarding a good past performance record (e.g., a reduction in deforestation rates or 
decrease in emissions over the past years). 
  High implementing capacity (e.g., good performance in governance indicators). 
  Supporting projects that open up new opportunities to reduce emissions. (e.g., a first 
project in a certain sector, or a demonstration projects for a new technology). 
3. Developed country funding for emissions reductions in developing countries is unlikely to 
be significant and sustained without some form of mutually agreed measurement, reporting 
and verification (MRV) at the international level. Developed countries want developing 
countries to submit frequent and internationally verified reports (as developed countries do 
already) to the United Nations. Some developing countries argue that they should not be 
obliged to do so, consistent with their lesser obligations and responsibilities in general.  
Should major developing country emitters commit to submit internationally verified national 
emission reports at least every other year? 
  Yes 
 
  No  
 
Please include any additional comments 
4. If there is international financial support for emissions reductions in a developing country, 
who should verify recipient government reports on actions taken and emissions reductions 
achieved?  
  The institution that provided the funds. 
 
  The UN, other international organization, or some other third party. 
 
4. Adaptation  
 
1. Developed countries acknowledge a moral obligation to help low‐income developing 
countries adapt to climate change. As with funding for emission reductions, negotiators are 
at odds over how adaptation funds should be allocated.  
How important should the following criteria be? (Should not be a factor at all — Should play a 
limited role — Should play a considerable role — Should play a very considerable role) 
  Vulnerability (e.g., a combination of predicted climate impacts and importance of 
exposed sectors) 
  Need measured in terms of per capita income (lower income greater need) and total 
population. 
  Overall cost efficiency of each country’s proposed actions. 
  Good past performance record (e.g., improvements in water management or health 
system capacity) and high implementing capacity (e.g., good performance in governance 
indicators) 
2. Estimates of the amount of money needed for adaptation to climate change in the 
developing world range from $30 billion to upwards of $100 billion dollars a year. Parties 
agree that these funds should be additional to development assistance (now about $120 
billion a year). But because it is hard to distinguish between development and adaptation 
projects (e.g., water management or disaster response planning), it is likely that funding for 
adaption will face problems similar those that characterize development assistance, 
including, for example, so‐called “absorptive capacity.”  
How much adaptation funding per year do you think can be effectively used in the short run, 
in addition to current development assistance? (Assume that funds are managed in the way 
you prefer.)   None 
  Less than $25 billion 
  $25 to $50 billion 
  $50 to $100 billion 
  More than $100 billion 
Please include any additional comments 
 
5. Governance of Climate Related Financial Flows 
 
1. Implementing an effective climate agreement will require new arrangements for managing 
climate‐related financial flows. Some countries favor a limited carbon market, and would like 
to see most investment managed by international institutions. Even if world leaders put in 
place a strong carbon market, there will be a role for public institutions, for instance, in 
investing where the market cannot reach, or in ensuring the quality of carbon credits.  
Should the following public institutions be involved in these tasks? (Should not be involved at 
all – Should take on only very limited responsibilities – Should take on some responsibilities – 
Should take on very broad responsibilities) 
  The World Bank Group. 
  Regional development banks. 
  Hybrid instruments like the Adaptation Fund (overseen by UNFCCC, with World Bank 
trusteeship and GEF secretariat services), or the Clean Investment Funds (administered 
by the World Bank together with regional development banks, and with a separate 
board). 
  UN organizations. 
  A new World Climate Fund, under UNFCCC governance, with a full support structure, 
including a permanent secretariat. 
  Bilateral donor agencies. 
  UNFCCC‐accredited domestic institutions in developing countries. Please include any additional comments 
2. Developing countries insist that climate finance is different from development assistance: 
it is not a voluntary gift, but a payment as part of a global compact to reduce emissions. 
Developed countries hope to retain some control over the use of funds. Therefore, 
negotiators have struggled to compromise on the balance between recipients and 
contributors in governing funds.  
How favorably do you view the following governance arrangements in overseeing climate 
funding? (Excellent – Good – Adequate – Should not be considered at all) 
  One country, one vote (as in UN organizations). 
  A majority of Board seats for developing countries, but with a blocking minority of 
developed‐country seats. (as in the Adaptation Fund). 
  Equal numbers of Board seats for developed and developing countries, with consensus 
decision‐making (as in the Clean Investment Funds). 
  Shareholder voting (as in the World Bank). 
  Shareholder voting, but weighted inversely to a country’s emissions (i.e., for each $ 
contributed, India receives 14 times more votes than the U.S., and three times more 
than China.) 
Please include any additional comments 
 
6. Trade 
 
1. Countries worry that they might become less competitive if they impose strict emission 
reduction rules while others do not. Many want to reserve the right to impose tariffs on 
imports from countries with less stringent rules. Yet, developing countries worry that these 
trade measures would imperil market access, and want to prohibit them in the climate 
agreement.  
Assuming that countries are only willing to take meaningful action on climate change if they 
can impose trade measures, would you permit them to do so? 
  Yes. Parties may levy border adjustments that impose a burden on foreign producers 
equal to the burden emission control legislation imposes on domestic producers. 
  No, trade measures should not be permitted at all. 
  No, but parties may use trade measures against countries that persistently fail to 
comply with their treaty commitments, or refuse to join the agreement. Please include any additional  comments 
7. Finally: How Much Action Would You Take Personally?  
 
1. What is the maximum you would be ready to pay each year for a guarantee that the world 
will never experience a degree of climate change that you would consider dangerous?  
The following percentage (%) of my household's net income: 
2. If the international community agrees on action that is sufficient to avoid dangerous 
climate change, how much do you think it will actually cost your household per year?  
The following percentage (%) of my household's net income: 
8. Please Tell Us About Yourself  
 
1.  Your Age 
 
 
2. Your Gender 
 
3. Employment 
If you would like, please identify your employer 
 
4. Do you work professionally on climate change? 
  
5. Do you work professionally on other environmental issues? 
  
6. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on climate change? 
 
7. How closely are you following the Copenhagen negotiations? 
 
8. Do you believe the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations matters in whether the world 
succeeds in limiting climate change? 
 
9. What is your highest academic degree? 
 
10. Which discipline were you trained in? 
 
 Thank you for taking your time and sharing your views!  